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1. Introduction
World War I, for all the loss of life and material destruction it brought, acted as a catalyst for
many historical processes. Many important political, economic and social developments of
the 20
th
century presumably would have happened anyway, but the war accelerated them.
One of them is the emergence of modern central banks in the 1920s in an attempt to
overcome the monetary chaos of the war years and the immediate post-war period. While this
process is reasonably well documented and understood for some parts of the world (Goodhart
1988, de Cecco 1997), this article will focus on the under-researched experiences of South-
East Europe (SEE in the following), namely Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia.
Banks of note issue were not new to this part of Europe. They had been founded
shortly after political independence (Greece: 1830; Romania and Serbia: 1878; Bulgaria:
1908) as foundation of a modern monetary system (National Bank of Greece: 1841;
Bulgarian National Bank: 1879
1
; National Bank of Romania: 1880; Privileged National Bank
of the Kingdom of Serbia: 1884). Yet these four institutions were not central banks; they
were commercial banks – usually the largest in their land and initially often the only one –
and lender to the government, to mention only the two most obvious features disqualifying
them as central banks in the way these new institutions became theoretically conceptualised
in the 1920s. Commercial banking and lending to the government collided so severely with
the issuance of convertible bank notes that the monetary system found itself in considerable
disarray in all four countries in the 1880s and 1890s (Morys 2014).
1
Bulgaria had obtained far-reaching autonomy in 1878, releasing the country into independence in all but
name.
2The importance of World War I in this context was that it wrecked the monetary
system to the extent that a fundamental reorganisation of the banks of note issue in all four
countries seemed inevitable. The war in SEE had been almost exclusively financed by the
printing press, resulting in inflation and depreciation of extraordinary size even for the low
standards of the war and immediate post-war experience. The perennial conflict between debt
monetisation and a sound monetary system had become so acute that the 1920s international
movement towards independent central banks had particularly strong resonance in SEE.
Yet if there was a global trend towards independent central banks in the 1920s, what
was special to the Balkan countries
2
in our context? Firstly, the level of international
involvement: While Western European countries achieved their objective largely on their
own, Central, East and South-East Europe (CESEE in the following) did so with outside help.
Such help came mostly through the League of Nations, which saw the independence of
central banks as a prerequisite for joining and successfully adhering to gold. As resurrecting
the gold standard was a key objective of interwar economic reconstruction efforts, spreading
the gospel of central bank independence became a means to achieve it. Yet persuasion was
combined with pressure: CESEE countries required loans from Western Europe to replenish
their reserves; the lending countries (mainly France and the U.K.) insisted on central bank
independence and a certain amount of international financial supervision in return. The
lending countries reckoned that both elements were vital in ensuring long-term gold standard
membership of the CESEE countries, thereby achieving the trade-related goal of eliminating
the risk of ever weaker currencies in the region (and the trade disadvantages which Western
Europe might incur as a result).
Yet in the case of SEE, central bank independence and exchange-rate stability had
another dimension which was absent in Central and Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland and the Baltic countries started off with clean balance sheets
3
, as political
independence only came with World War I. In their cases, central bank independence and
exchange-rate stabilisation aimed at providing overall stability and preventing continuously
depreciating currencies. In SEE, however, the objective was broader and, arguably, more
toxic from the onset. As all four countries were burdened by substantial debt-to-GDP levels
already before the war, exchange-rate stabilisation in the 1920s also aimed at ensuring debt
repayment by avoiding a currency mismatch between government revenue and expenditure.
2
We use the Balkans interchangeably for SEE.
3
To be precise: Successor states to Austria-Hungary mostly accepted some of the debt of the dual monarchy,
but sums were small compared to SEE debt levels.
3The interwar period looked set to repeat the pre-war experience, when the creditor countries,
in the cases of Greece and Serbia, had reduced government interference with the bank of note
issue and had effectively pushed both countries onto the gold standard (as part of the
financial supervision arrangements Greece and Serbia had entered into following their
defaults in 1893 and 1895, respectively).
In other words, central bank independence, exchange-rate stabilisation and
conditionality imposed by foreign lenders in the 1920s built on pre-war precedents.
Sometimes, there was even institutional continuity. In the Greek case, for instance, the
International Financial Commission not only monitored government finances until World
War I, but was revived after the war and entrusted with supervising the two League of
Nations loans of 1924 and 1928. World War I both interrupted and reinforced the pre-war
pattern. The war acted as a caesura in that the bank of note issue lost any room of manoeuvre
vis-à-vis the government, exchange-rates began to fluctuate wildly and foreign supervision
effectively came to a halt. Yet the “need” for all three elements of the pre-war order rose as
time went on. In some sense, then, the 1920s appear as a restoration and continuation of the
pre-war arrangement.
The remainder of this contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the key
characteristics of the period of monetary stabilisation in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and
Serbia in the two decades before World War I. We will argue that this period established
many patterns between governments, banks of note issue and foreign lenders which were
effectively resurrected in the interwar period. The third section deals with the monetary chaos
of the war and immediate post-war years. While this was a common experience of many
belligerent countries, the scale of inflation and depreciation was exceptionally high in SEE;
an experience which created a profound and urgent need for stabilisation policies of which
central bank independence was a crucial pillar. The fourth section is devoted to the 1920s
quest for central bank independence: What exactly was the bargain between SEE countries
and foreign lenders that resulted in central bank independence? Why was the League of
Nations involved in the cases of Bulgaria and Greece, while Romania and Yugoslavia opted
for more conventional bilateral loans? Last but not least, how independent were the central
banks in practical terms, and why was banking supervision and regulation not part of the
reform package?
42. Currency stabilisation and bank of note issue reform 1890s-1912 (1
st
Balkan War)
Exchange-rate stabilisation and central bank independence were two sides of the same coin in
the 1920s. Stable exchange-rates were seen as an important economic policy objective and
central bank independence was viewed as the means to achieve it. An additional
consideration was important in the case of the SEE countries given their high government
debt levels: creditor countries – often articulating their views through the League of Nations –
viewed stable exchange-rates as the best way to ensure debt repayment. This provided an
additional incentive to use their leverage – i.e., their ability to help replenish currency
reserves by means of an international loan – to bargain for an independent central bank.
This quid-pro-quo had clear precedents in the two decades before World War I. In this
perspective, the 1920s resume a trend towards more independent banks of note issue
stretching back to the 1890s but interrupted by six years of war (Balkan Wars 1912/13 and
World War I). The period of exchange-rate stabilisation in South-East Europe lasted from ca.
1890 to 1912, when one country after another stabilised their exchange-rates vis-à-vis de jure
gold standard countries such as the UK and Germany. Using a typical definition of
shadowing the gold standard (maintaining the exchange-rate within +/- 2.0% deviation from
mint parity), de facto adherence began in 1890 for Romania, in 1906 for Bulgaria, in 1909 for
Serbia in 1909 and in 1910 for Greece (Morys 2014: 45). Yet this was only the last step in a
long drawn-out process which was the result of domestic efforts as much as of foreign
pressure; only Romania was able to achieve stable exchange-rates on its own.
The most clear-cut case was Greece. The country re-entered international bond
markets in 1879, when a debt compromise was reached over the Independence Loans of
1824-25 which the country had defaulted on in 1843 (Lazaretou 2014: 102). Financial
markets proved so eager to supply funds that the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 179% in 1893
when the government defaulted; in urgent need of a new loan some years later, Greece
consented to financial supervision by its main lenders in 1898. The details of this
arrangement foreshadowed the 1920s loan accord with the League of Nations and deserve our
attention.
Starting point of the lenders was that exchange-rate stabilisation was the best means
to ensure debt repayment. Theoretically, there was no connection between domestic monetary
system and foreign loans which were all denominated in foreign currency (Lazaretou 2014:
121). Yet in practice, stable exchange-rates help avoid currency mismatch between
government revenue and expenditure, in turn making foreign debt payments more likely.
5Given that the exchange-rate had depreciated more than 60% against mint parity by
the time of negotiations, currency stabilisation was an uphill task and the creditor countries
were in desperate need to find domestic institutions they could rely on and work with. The
National Bank of Greece (NBG) offered itself as a natural ally. The Bank (founded in 1841)
had been able to avoid government interference in its first two decades of existence, but had
subsequently become subservient to the government. Financing persistent budget deficits was
the norm of the day, and illiquid government debt as part of total assets peaked at 55% in
1897 (Lazaretou 2014: 165). From the perspective of the NBG, the International Financial
Commission of 1898 was a welcome vehicle to clean up its balance sheet. The Greek
government was obliged to pay back the loans to the NBG, reducing the money supply and
improving the exchange-rate in the process. Given the scale of Greece’s financial problems in
1898, this would be a lengthy process, but by 1910 the exchange-rate reached parity,
government debt held by the NBG had been more than halved and foreign debt was brought
down to a manageable 90%.
The pattern in Serbia and Bulgaria was similar but of smaller scale. Serbia opened up
to international capital markets in 1881 (three years after political independence) and
accumulated so much foreign debt that its debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 138% in 1895 when it
defaulted. As part of the 1895 Karlsbad debt restructuring with its creditors (mainly Austria-
Hungary), Serbia was obliged to stabilise its exchange-rate and accept foreign supervision.
Similar to the Greek case, the National Bank of Serbia became the natural ally of the creditor
countries and benefitted from a complete re-payment of all government debt by 1906. Serbia
stabilised its exchange-rate in 1909, by which time the debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 102%.
The Bulgarian experience was the mildest. The country did not default, but entered
into a financial supervision arrangement in 1902 as a precondition for another international
loan (Tooze&Ivanov 2011: 33-37). Similar to Greece and Serbia, the creditors insisted on
currency stabilisation (which was achieved by 1906) and on the repayment of government
debt held by the Bulgarian National Bank. As opposed to the other two countries, government
debt-to-GDP levels were allowed to rise and stood at 37% in 1911 (as opposed to 22% in
1902).
63. The wartime impact on the SEE monetary systems
The Balkan Wars (1912/13) and World War I brought two decades of sound money and
relatively stable exchange-rates to an abrupt end. While this was not uncommon – and indeed
is one of the central themes of this edited volume - , the scale of monetary disruption was
particularly large in SEE. Naturally, World War I affected the monetary systems of the four
countries differently, depending on the amount of actual combat on home territory (more in
Serbia and Romania than in Bulgaria and Greece), whether a country had to deal with a
separate monetary authority of the occupying forces (as in Romania between 1916 and 1918,
cf. Stoenescu et al. 2014: 245) and, last but not least, when exactly the country entered the
war (Serbia: July 1914; Bulgaria: October 1915; Romania: August 1916; Greece: June 1917).
Serbia and Romania, for instance, had to physically relocate their bank offices which resided
in Marseille (in allied France) and in Iasi (in non-occupied Romania) during the war.
Yet similarities between the SEE countries were stronger than differences. This is not
least the case, as military – and as a result monetary – turmoil started with the Balkan Wars
1912/13 which involved all four countries. We will therefore follow convention in Balkan
economic history and refer to a “long” war period from 1912 to 1918. In the case of Greece,
the war period extended beyond 1918, as World War I was followed by the Greco-Turkish
war (1919-1922).
The monetary systems in SEE are poorly researched for the war period, yet the
available evidence points to disruptions similar to the Western European experience: gold
convertibility was suspended (in so far as it had existed previously, cf. Morys 2014: 41-42),
the payments systems collapsed, exchange-rates began to float freely and stock exchanges
closed (Athens, Bucharest and the smaller exchanges of Belgrade and Sofia). Disruptions
began with the first Balkan War in October 1912, but were partly reversed after the second
Balkan War in late 1913; they became more profound again starting in august 1914, affecting
Serbia immediately but increasingly also the initially neutral countries of Bulgaria, Greece
and Romania.
The main evidence we have systematically preserved for all four countries is the
balance sheet data of the four banks of note issue, including the monetary base. We also have
reliable estimates of larger monetary aggregates (Austrian National Bank et al. 2014). They
provide evidence of how governments financed the war efforts and the disruptions caused in
their monetary systems in the process. Table 1 shows the growth rates of three key monetary
variables in a growth accounting framework. Following Fratianni&Spinelli (2001), the
7growth of broad money is decomposed into the growth of the money multiplier and the
growth of the monetary base. In order to understand how governments financed the war, the
growth of the monetary base is then decomposed into its two components, i.e., the treasury
component of the monetary base and all other parts of the monetary base. The treasury
component of the monetary base captures central bank lending to the government and hence
shows to what extent government expenditure was covered by the “printing press”. There are
four periods of interest: a) pre-war financial supervision, i.e., from when the country entered
into such an arrangement to the eve of the Balkan Wars
4
; b) the war period; c) post-war
stabilisation from 1919 to the year preceding de facto exchange-rate stabilisation and (d) the
interwar gold standard.
[Add table 1 about here]
Taking war and post-war stabilisation period together, all four countries experienced broad
money growth in excess of 20% p.a. for a period of at least 12 years. In all cases,
approximately half or more of that growth is attributable to growth in the treasury component
of the monetary base; in other words, between 45% (Romania) and 81% (Bulgaria) of overall
money growth is explained by debt monetisation on behalf of the government. This suggests
that the printing press was the main form of financing World War I in SEE, a finding in line
with the qualitative literature on the topic as far as it exists (Romania and Serbia).
Table 1 also shows that the post-war stabilisation period was not much different. In
the cases of Romania and Yugoslavia, money growth in this period even exceeded war time
growth. Some of this reflects the growth of the national economy due to territorial expansion;
yet in both cases the largest contribution to money growth came again from growth in the
treasury component of the monetary base, demonstrating the extraordinary financial needs of
the time.
[Add table 2 about here]
Another indicator to appreciate the level of monetary expansion during the war is the level of
depreciation of the interwar gold standard compared to its pre-war predecessor (table 2). It
allows for (indirect) comparison with other European countries which also expanded their
4
In the case of Romania, we choose the period of gold standard adherence.
8money supplies at the time. While some countries re-pegged in the 1920s at the pre-war
parity – most notably the U.K. – most countries were forced to devalue. The standard practice
was to initially stabilise the exchange-rate at some level; if the level proved sustainable, this
exchange-rate was declared the new currency parity. Ceteris paribus, higher levels of
depreciation between the two gold standard eras stand for a higher level of monetary
expansion and are suggestive of more extensive use of the “printing press” to finance the war
(as opposed to bond issues). SEE countries depreciated by an unusually wide margin: From
all other European countries, only Portugal depreciated by more than factor 10; the standard
case was somewhere between 4 and 6. The four SEE countries also stand out in comparison
to Central and Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia – which was the only country in the region to
continue with the old currency – depreciated only by factor 6.8.
Why was debt monetisation the preferred option to finance the war effort in SEE?
Before the war, budget deficits had been closed either by debt monetisation or by capital
imports; a meaningful recourse to domestic savings was not available given the scarcity of
them. As foreign funds dried up (including from the respective war allies), financing World
War I through bond issuance was simply not feasible and the “printing press” was the only
option available. This helps explain the extraordinarily high money growth rates during the
war period and, in turn, the urgent need for stabilisation policies in the 1920s. This is what we
turn to now.
4. The emergence of modern central banks in the interwar period
In late 1918, the banks of note issue in all four countries were a shadow of the institutions
they had been only six years earlier on the eve of the Balkan Wars: they had become fully
subservient to the needs of the treasury and they presided over bloated balance sheets full of
illiquid government debt. Yet another 10 years later, fortunes had reversed again and all of
them had acquired a position stronger than before the war: they had been re-organised into
genuine central banks; they enjoyed a larger degree of independence vis-à-vis the
government, both legally and practically; they were (or would shortly become) full-fledged
members of the interwar gold standard
5
and they had used the proceeds of international loans
to bring their currency reserves to comfortable levels.
5
They had only shadowed the pre-war gold standard, with the exception of Romania (1890-1912) and Greece
(1910-1914).
9Developments in SEE were part of a broader trend towards independent central banks.
The U.S. and the U.K. – the two largest economies of the time and the main drivers of
currency stabilisation in the 1920s – were deeply concerned over the wildly fluctuating
exchange-rates of the immediate post-war era. Floating rates did not provide sufficient
stability and predictability for a return to trade and capital flows of pre-war levels. Yet the
main fear was that the less developed countries of Europe would try to use ever weaker
exchange-rates to gain a trade advantage over the U.S. and Britain (both countries were
determined to maintain the pre-war parity). Moreover, the spread of universal suffrage in the
wake of World War I meant that parliaments could no longer be trusted to reign in spendthrift
governments, increasing the pressure on banks of note issue to monetise budget deficits. If
exchange-rate stability was the objective of U.S. and U.K. government policy throughout the
1920s, they needed a means to achieve it. If monetary policy was to remain orthodox, the
monetary authority needed to be shielded more from government pressure than had been the
case before the war; hence the quest for central bank independence in the interwar period.
This movement was pan-European. Yet it took its clearest form in Central, East and
South-East Europe. West European countries, by and large, stabilised exchange-rates on their
own; in the process, they often made their banks of note issue more independent, but this
would not necessarily find its way into a new charter, let alone lead to a complete
restructuring of the bank. Yet in Eastern Europe, the latest academic thinking on central
banking could be more directly applied. In the successor states of the Habsburg and Romanov
empires, in particular, new central banks needed to be established and provided with charters.
The situation in SEE presented itself differently but no less receptive to modern
central banking. Banks of note issue existed due to earlier political independence. The grand
bargaining tool of the U.K. and France
6
was their promise to help replenish exhausted
currency reserves by means of international loans. As demonstrated in section 3, governments
relied on seigniorage to close budget deficits for several years after the end of the war; once
inflation and depreciation had taken their course, exchange-rates began to stabilise at heavily
reduced levels but reserves were too low to introduce convertibility (table 2 provides dates of
de facto and de jure stabilisation). The Yugoslav case is extreme with only 8% reserves to
bank notes in 1925, yet even Romania as the country with the highest reserve level (33% in
1927) had some ground to cover. This would take several years and require outside help; a
6
As the 1920s went on, the U.S. became less and France became more important (cf. above).
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situation which the lenders took as an opportunity to insist on independent central banks as a
precondition for the loan.
In the case of SEE, independent central banks and exchange-rate stabilisation also
served the ‘traditional’ interest to secure debt repayment. Payment obligations could stem
from pre-war debt but also from reparations. Bulgaria – the only SEE country allied to the
central powers and subjected to reparations at the treaty of Neuilly (November 1919) –
illustrates the logic of the argument particularly well: de facto exchange-rate stabilisation
came here earliest, as France – major recipient of the reparation payments but also large
holder of pre-war debt – effectively forced Bulgaria to do so (Nenovsky&Dimitrova 2006).
Yet while the exchange-rate was henceforth stabilised (an achievement only possible with
capital controls), Bulgaria could not contemplate moving towards convertibility. Bulgaria’s
reserves – many of which had been in German currency given the wartime alliance – were
badly hit by the 1923 German hyperinflation and could barely cover a fifth of bank notes in
circulation.
An international loan was the way forward, yet where could it come from? Bulgaria’s
debt-to-GDP ratio stood (even after the reduction of reparation payments) at 81% in 1924. In
this distressed situation, Bulgaria followed in the footsteps of Austria and Hungary which had
turned to the League of Nations for loan agreements in 1923 and 1924, respectively. While
such loans were issued through normal banking houses, the League of Nations provided
credibility by imposing conditionality. A first such loan was issued in 1926 and devoted to
the more immediate business of resettling refugees, followed by a second loan in 1928
specifically devoted to currency stabilisation (Dimitrova&Ivanov 2014: 217).
Greece’s international loans were also issued under the auspices of the League of
Nations. The League loans had developed (not entirely unfounded) the reputation of
providing funds to countries vanquished in World War I; yet after the military, political and
economic disaster in Asia Minor (1922) Greece found itself in a comparable situation in that
it was shut out of international capital markets. It took out a first loan in 1924; after exploring
other loan options which all failed, it turned again to the League of Nations in 1928 for
another loan specifically devoted to currency stabilisation.
The Romanian and the Yugoslav cases deviate somewhat, yet not enough to exclude
the two countries from our analysis. In the Romanian case, the only major difference was that
the League of Nations was not involved in issuing the loan, but it was a bilateral arrangement
with France; a difference which mainly reflects the desire to keep the British at arm’s length.
In all other aspects, it followed very much the League standard script (Torre&
11
We are on less clear grounds regarding the Yugoslav case which awaits further
research. There is no indication that Yugoslavia contemplated going through the League of
Nations. This might reflect political pride and the availability of outside options, but it might
also reflect lingering political resentment at the League for mishandling the Fiume affair.
Negotiations for an English loan broke down in 1928 and it took another three years to
eventually agree on a loan with France (Hinic et al. 2014).
What exactly did central bank independence mean and how was it secured? In the view of
contemporaries, three conditions needed to be met: the bank needed to be statutorily
independent, its main task was to preserve the value of the currency and it required a
sufficient endowment of reserves (de Cecco 1997; Christodoulaki 2002). The third condition
was met by virtue of the international loans; analysing the first two will demonstrate how far
reforms went at the time.
Statutory independence aimed at keeping government influence at bay. It revolved
around three issues: the organisational form, the appointment of the board and the governor,
and the question of state finance. Ideally, the central bank was organised as a private joint
stock company, the board and the governor were elected by the shareholders, and state
finance was prohibited. The Bank of England came close to this ideal and served as role
model at the time; not least as a result of the overarching British influence on the Financial
Committee of the League of Nations.
In terms of organisational form, the Bank of Greece came closest to this ideal: the
newly founded institution (cf. below) was (and has remained to this day) a private joint stock
company, of which the state and state institutions were not allowed to own more than one-
tenth (Christodoulaki 2002: 20). The case of the Bulgarian National Bank – the only SEE
bank of note issue which had always been fully state-owned – , by contrast, showed the limits
of influence of the League of Nations when it failed to impose a privatisation scheme
(Avramov 2006: 61). As far as the appointment of the governor was concerned, different
rules existed but in all cases government approval (or even nomination) was required (de
Cecco 1997: 104). State finance was the most delicate issue. In the cases of the more
advanced CESEE economies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, an outright ban of
state finance was written into the charters. Given the scarcity of domestic savings in Bulgaria,
Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia and an underdeveloped commercial banking system, such
an approach appeared impractical; rather, the bank charter chose to regulate state finance by
fixing precise limits to its timing and maximum extent (de Cecco 1997: 82). As table 1
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shows, debt monetisation remained unimportant under the interwar gold standard. This
suggests that the facilities provided for state finance were only used on a temporary basis but
not to systematically close budget deficits.
Confining the central bank’s task to preserving the value of the currency was meant to
avoid conflict of interest: by removing the commercial banking activities, the central bank
would henceforth be able to focus exclusively on the gold link. This worked well in the cases
of Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, yet created considerable problems in the case of
Greece. The National Bank of Greece, a private joint stock company since its foundation in
1841, refused to give up its highly profitable commercial banking activities; the only solution
left was to create a new institution – the Bank of Greece – specifically as a central bank
(Christodoulaki 2002: 15-17). While this satisfied the League of Nations’ requirements
formally, the solution found undermined the new Bank of Greece from its inception. The
Bank of Greece remained in the shadow of the National Bank of Greece and never assumed
the central position in the country’s financial architecture that the reform was meant to give
it. The National Bank of Greece remained too big in comparison and the Bank of Greece held
too many illiquid assets (transferred to it from the balance sheet of the National Bank of
Greece) to make its monetary policy effective (Christodoulaki 2002: 23).
While the interwar stabilisation efforts invested much faith in the letter of the central
bank charter, securing the independence of the central bank and safeguarding stable
exchange-rates also came through other means, in particular through the League of Nations.
In the Greek case, for instance, the 1928 loan-cum-conditionality agreement between Greece
and the League provided for a strict supervision over fiscal policy in general (Pepelasis
Minoglou 1993: 203). Budgets had to be balanced, and foreign experts in conjunction with
the Greek authorities had to report every three months in detail on the fiscal situation. The
other country cases are less well studied, but financial supervision by the League and foreign
creditors seems to have been conducted along similar lines (Avramov 2006: 62; Torre&Tosi
2009: 94-95).
By the late 1920s, then, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia all had modern central
banks. On the face of it, the four institutions exhibited the key characteristics of a modern
central bank in a purer form than was the case for older institutions such as the Bank of
England and the Banque de France. Yet faithful adoption of state-of-the-art central bank
charters did not necessarily guarantee central bank independence in practice. In the following,
13
we will point to some possible innovations which the 1920s reforms did not include. Both
aspects became important when the mid-1920s boom gave way to the Great Depression.
On some level, central bank independence was tied too narrowly to the interwar gold
standard. The issuing privilege of the Bank of Greece, for instance, could be withdrawn if the
bank failed to ensure gold convertibility (Christodoulaki 2002: 17); this stipulation was
understandable given that central bank independence aimed at ensuring exchange-rate
stability. Yet it became problematic, when economic conditions turned adverse with the onset
of the Great Depression and defending the exchange-rate was no longer feasible (as was
arguably the case for Greece in April 1932): the door was again wide open for government
interference and central bank independence came under threat when it was needed most.
Last but not least, while the 1920s efforts at currency stabilisation resulted in
(relatively) independent central banks, this reform process did not turn the central bank into
the bank of banks: supervision and regulation of banks came only in the 1930s (de Cecco
1997, Christodoulaki 2002). Financial experts at the time discussed whether central banks
should supervise banks, yet it was thought that currency stabilisation was their main task and
that they should not be overburdened by assuming another, not yet clearly specified task. The
1920s discussions failed to realise that long-term currency stabilisation also required stable
banks; the interconnectedness between currency crises and banking crises became clear to
many contemporaries only with the 1931 European financial crisis which in most of the
affected countries exhibited characteristics of both types of crisis. It was only in response to
the 1930s banking crises that the responsibilities of a central bank were widened to also
include the supervision and regulation of commercial banks.
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Table 1
Money growth accounting for Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Serbia/Yugoslavia
Growth of monetary aggregates
(in per cent)
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ey
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Bulgaria
Financial
supervision I
1903-
1911
10.0 -2.2 8.7 1.9 1.6
War period 1912-
1918
30.6 20.3 16.4 1.0 -7.0
Post-war
stabilisation
1919-
1923
17.8 20.5 -12.7 3.6 6.4
Interwar gold
standard
1924-
1930
7.2 -23.1 11.1 12.7 6.5
Greece
Financial
supervision I
1898-
1911
5.0 -0.7 0.7 0.0 5.0
War period 1912-
1922
24.6 17.8 8.2 2.5 -3.9
Post-war
stabilisation
1923-
1926
12.5 2.1 6.2 2.6 1.6
Interwar gold
standard
1927-
1931
13.2 -3.2 -0.6 0.1 16.9
Romania
Pre-1914
gold standard
1890-
1911
5.3 -0.2 5.0 0.0 0.6
War period 1912-
1918
21.6 10.6 23.2 -2.8 -9.3
Post-war
stabilisation
1919-
1926
25.5 10.9 8.7 -0.4 6.4
Interwar gold
standard
1927-
1931
8.5 -12.2 8.8 3.0 8.9
Serbia / Yugoslavia
Financial
supervision I
1896-
1911
6.8 -0.5 7.0 0.4 n.a.
War period 1912-
1918
29,5 16.1 16.9 -3.5 n.a.
Post-war
stabilisation
1919-
1924
40.2 33.1 6.6 0.5 n.a.
Interwar gold
standard
1925-
1930
-1.1 -1.2 0.1 0.0 n.a.
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Source: Own calculations based on South-Eastern European Monetary and Economic
Statistics from the Nineteenth Century to World War II (2014).
Table 2 gold standard adherence in the interwar period
exchange-rate
stabilisation
end of gold standard duration on gold
Countries de facto de jure depreciatio
n
vis-à-vis
pre-war
parity
by means
of capital
controls
by formal
suspension
or
devaluation
de facto de jure
South-East
Europe
Bulgaria 05/1924 12/1928 26.71 10/1931 n.a. 7y 6m 2y11m
Greece 01/1927 05/1928 14.87 09/1931 04/1932 5y 4m 4y 0m
Romania 03/1927 02/1929 32.26 10/1931 n.a. 4y 8m 2y 9m
Yugoslavia 07/1925 05/1931 10.96 05/1932 n.a. 7y 11m 1y 1m
6y 4m 2y 8m
Western Europe
Austria 10/1922 12/1924 n.a. 10/1931 04/1933 9y 1m 7y 1m
Belgium 10/1926 10/1926 6.94 03/1935 03/1935 8y 6m 8y 6m
France 12/1926 06/1928 4.93 09/1936 9y 10m 8y 4m
Germany 09/1924 08/1924 n.a. 07/1931 n.a. 6y 9m 7y
Netherlands 11/1924 04/1925 1.00 09/1936 11y 11m 11y 6m
UK 01/1925 05/1925 1.00 09/1931 6y 9m 6y 5m
Switzerland 11/1924 06/1925 1.00 09/1936 11y 11m 11y 4m
9y 3m 8y 7m
Southern
Europe
Italy 07/1927 12/1927 3.67 05/1934 09/1936 6y11m 6y 6m
Portugal 06/1928 06/1931 24.30 10/1931 10/1931 3y 5m 5m
5y 2m 3y 6m
Scandinavia
Denmark 06/1926 01/1927 1.00 09/1931 5y 4m 4y 9m
Finland 11/1923 12/1925 7.66 10/1931 8y 5y 11m
Norway 09/1927 05/1928 1.00 09/1931 4y 1m 3y 5m
Sweden 01/1922 04/1924 1.00 09/1931 9y 9m 7y 6m
6y10m 5y 5m
Central and
East Europe
Czechoslovakia 03/1923 03/1925 6.84 10/1931 02/1934 8y 8m 6y 8m
Estonia 12/1924 01/1928 n.a. 11/1931 06/1933 7y 3y11m
Latvia 11/1922 08/1922 n.a. 10/1931 9y 9y 3m
Hungary 01/1925 04/1925 n.a. 07/1931 6y 7m 6y 4m
Lithuania 01/1922 n.a. 10/1935 13y 10m
Poland 10/1926 10/1927 n.a. 04/1936 6y 7m 5y 7m
8y 7m 6y 4m
Sources: League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks 1927, 1929, 1932/33, 1935/36 and 1938/39.
